An Outline and Assessment of Canadian Relations with China from 1970 to 2015

Author’s note: This is a research paper that I wrote as an undergrad years ago, so forgive me if some of the writing here is rather clunky. (I did go back and edit some of the more awkward sentences.) Also, this paper is by no means a comprehensive overview of this topic.

Introduction

The history of Canada’s relations with China is an interesting case study of the diplomacy between a liberal democratic middle power and a developing goliath under one-party authoritarian rule, a case study that has been well examined by scholars. According to Evans, Canada has always treated relations with China as a “moral enterprise,” attempting to nudge China towards liberal democracy through engagement.[1] However, Burton believes that the Canadian government has continually struggled to find the right balance between economic interests and human rights concerns in their diplomacy with China.[2] The evolution of Canada-China relations from 1970–2015, when seen through the lens of this struggle, reflects not only the limits of Canadian political and economic influence on the international stage, but also China’s growing political and economic leverage over these years. While each of the five Prime Ministers within this period pursued their own brand of human rights diplomacy and trade policy with China, all of them were constrained by practical considerations in international politics and domestic concerns, greatly limiting their achievements in these areas.

Pierre Trudeau

In 1970, Canada established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the incumbent regime of mainland China, while severing its official diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (ROC), the incumbent regime of Taiwan. Both regimes considered itself the sole legitimate government of China and claimed the other to be illegitimate.[3] Canada, under Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal administration, chose a middle ground approach when dealing with this sovereignty issue: It “took note of” China’s claim of territorial sovereignty over Taiwan while still maintaining a non-sovereign diplomatic relationship with the regime in Taiwan.[4] After establishing diplomatic relations, Canada helped Communist China’s entry into the UN by voting “for” on a 1971 UN resolution that replaced the ROC with the PRC as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” and “one of the five permanent members of the [United Nations] Security Council.”[5],[6] Canada also aided China in its entry into other multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank.[7]

Due to bipolarism during the Cold War, Canada had, up to that point, followed the US in maintaining relations with the ROC instead of the PRC. Pierre Trudeau disliked the virulent anti-communism prevalent in the US during the Cold War; he wanted a Canadian foreign policy that was conducive to peace and independent from its powerful southern neighbour.[8] Reaching out to China allowed his Liberal administration to demonstrate such independence.[9] Meanwhile, Canadian public opinion of the two Chinese regimes was also shifting — sympathy for the authoritarian right-wing regime in Taiwan was weakening whereas that for the Communist regime in China was growing.[10] Trudeau himself was rather sympathetic to the Chinese Communist regime, as evidenced by his rather favourable depiction of Communist China in Two Innocents in Red China.[11] Moreover, Trudeau wanted to overcome the East-West hostilities of the Cold War, and his overtures to China was part of that initiative.[12] Through establishing diplomatic relations with China, Trudeau aimed to bring it out of isolation into the international community. He argued that it was a poor idea to leave the most populous nation in the world, one armed with nuclear weapons no less, as an international pariah.[13] He and his then top foreign policy advisor Ivan Head were optimistic that by opening up to the world, China would gradually “adjust its political, economic, and social practices to bring them into harmony with international norms.”[14] Their reasoning was that if the West could not change Communist China’s authoritarian ways by direct intervention, it should end China’s diplomatic isolation in order to change them through positive, piecemeal influence.

Despite not being the first country in the Western camp to establish official ties to the PRC, Canada set a precedent as well as a formula for a wave of thirty or so countries to follow Canada’s example: Establish diplomatic ties with the PRC by recognizing and not challenging its claim to Taiwan.[15] Moreover, while the correlation between Canada’s recognition of China and the US’s rapprochement with China is unclear,[16] the former created a reconciliatory atmosphere that was helpful for the latter to be achieved.

As a country with a long and painful colonial history, China strongly identifies itself as a victim of Western imperialism and colonization.[17] However, unlike many other nations in the West, Canada does not have a history of imperialism in the Far East. The biggest unresolved issue at the time of establishing relations was merely the payment of several Canadian-made ships that had been captured from the Nationalist government by the Communists during the Chinese Civil War and subsequently nationalized; this was resolved when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai offered visiting Canadian officials to pay back the costs of the ships in 1972.[18] On the other hand, Canadian Communist doctor Norman Bethune, who had died while supporting the Chinese Communist forces during WWII, was a household name in China thanks to an essay by Mao Zedong commemorating his selfless deeds.[19] Dr. Bethune gave the two nations a personal connection that other nations lacked. For the Chinese Communist regime, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada was motivated more by pragmatism: It was an effective way for China, who was then not on good terms with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, to gain legitimacy in international politics.[20] At the time, some European nations were also showing interest in establishing diplomatic ties, but China chose Canada due to its good reputation in the international community and its interest in a world order that rejected Cold War bipolarity.[21] Nevertheless, once China-US relations improved, relations with Canada were no longer a top diplomatic priority for China.[22]

Despite establishing relations, Canada did not put much emphasis on developing trade with China, as evidenced by the focus on Japan as Canada’s trade partner in the Asia-Pacific region as well as wheat being the only major Canadian export to China at the time (as it had been during the 1960s). [23] Indeed, Head claimed that Trudeau prioritized the political side of the Canada-China relationship over the commercial side.[24] Rather, Canada seemed to be more focused on helping China get back on its feet and re-enter international affairs. After the death of Mao Zedong, China left the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution behind and adopted an “open and reform” economic policy.[25] Canada took this opportunity to establish a bilateral aid program in 1981 through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada’s first with a Communist nation.[26]

Meanwhile, the Trudeau administration implemented a “silent diplomacy” approach regarding human rights in China despite Canada’s burgeoning human rights activism in international politics starting from the late 1970s.[27] During the Trudeau era, as the West was trying to recruit China as an ally against the USSR and integrate China into the international community, Canada, like many other nations at the time, stayed completely silent on Chinese human rights issues.[28]

Brian Mulroney

In 1985, the newly elected Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government announced that it would continue the China policies of the previous administration.[29] Nevertheless, Mulroney’s policies towards China began shifting focus on two key areas: trade and human rights.

Trade was clearly the primary focus of Mulroney’s China policies prior to 1989, evidenced by the strong emphasis on trade relations in the Canadian Strategy for China document issued in 1987.[30] The drafting of the document itself was motivated by Canada’s urge to capitalize on the gigantic and rapidly developing Chinese market, one that emerged due to the aforementioned “open and reform” policy.[31] Indeed, much of the document was dedicated to exploring how the Canadian government could assist Canadian businesses in navigating the Chinese market and further Canadian economic interests in China.[32]

On the other hand, Canada shifted from its “silent diplomacy” to “quiet diplomacy” during the first few years of the Mulroney administration. Quiet diplomacy differs from silent diplomacy in that the former involves raising the issue of human rights with another state, but usually only in private discussions between the government officials of the two states.[33] Quiet diplomacy ensures bilateral engagement on human rights while still maintaining good diplomatic relations. In his first visit to China as Prime Minister in 1986, Mulroney claimed to have devoted much of his meeting with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang to discussing human rights issues while being respectful of China’s state sovereignty, referring to human rights issues as “an internal matter” for China.[34] His low-key stance on human rights in China also reflected the general favourable sentiments of the Canadian public towards China prior to 1989, in part due to Canadian print media’s misguided positive portrayals of Communist China.[35] The briefing book prepared for Mulroney’s 1986 visit to China even claimed that “Canadians generally seem[ed] prepared to overlook this area of concern [China’s poor record on human and civil rights].”[36]

The Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 shattered much of the Canadian public’s naïve views of the Chinese Communist regime; in the wake of the Massacre, the Canadian public demanded tough action from its government.[37] The Massacre also dashed Canadian politicians’ hopes of China’s political reform and democratization following its rapid economic development.[38] As a result of the Massacre, the Mulroney administration radically altered its human rights policies regarding China from “quiet diplomacy” to the more direct and public “assertive diplomacy”.[39] The measures taken by Canada included granting visa extensions to Chinese students in Canada, supporting UN resolutions condemning China, deferring all high-level government contacts with China, and suspending Canadian developmental and commercial programs in China.[40]

Unfortunately, many of Canada’s “tough” measures against China after the massacre were either spottily implemented or largely symbolic with no real substance. For example, the government contact ban was never strictly followed by Canadian officials and had to be retroactively amended twice to accommodate repeated violations.[41] On the other hand, the suspension of aid towards Chinese projects such as the Three Gorges Dam seemed to be cherry-picked so as to have marginal impact on China.[42] According to then Canadian ambassador to China Earl Drake, these aid sanctions were put in place not to substantially punish the Chinese government and alter bilateral relations, but to “make a statement” regarding human rights to the public.[43] In fact, many other aid projects were not suspended, such as Canada’s $100 million loan to China for telecommunications equipment in 1989 that might have helped the Chinese government suppress domestic political dissent, a decision that angered the Chinese community in Canada.[44]

The insubstantial and inconsistent policies of assertive diplomacy carried out against China by the Mulroney administration after 1989 were largely a result of China’s growing political role in international politics as well as its increasingly important economic ties with Canada. Many other countries were also reluctant to sanction China; and Canadian businesses in China, most of which had resumed operations within three weeks of the Massacre, were never supportive of sanctions against China.[45] Mulroney claims in his memoir that his government “had resolutely kept up the pressure” on the Chinese government after the Massacre.[46] In reality, even after such an egregious human rights violation by the Chinese government, the Mulroney administration was not willing to sacrifice Canada’s increasingly important bilateral relations with China, opting instead for a middle road of taking half-measures to satisfy public opinion. As domestic public concern and international pressure to sanction China dissipated, the Mulroney administration gradually eased up on any punitive actions against China and restored bilateral relations.[47] In fact, before Mulroney stepped down as Prime Minister, he hosted then Chinese Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji at 24 Sussex to send the message that “Canada would be prepared to fully engage China in the years ahead.”[48] Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was Paul Desmarais, a leader of the Canadian business community and founder of the Canada-China Business Council, who suggested this friendly gesture to Mulroney.[49] These developments paved the way for Jean Chretien’s Liberal government to further adjust Canada’s relations with China towards emphasizing commerce.

Jean Chrétien

As Prime Minister, one of Jean Chretien’s top priorities was reducing Canada’s deficit left behind by previous administrations.[50] As a result, trade promotion was consistently a priority for Chretien’s foreign policy.[51] This priority carried over to his administration’s approach to relations with China. The Chretien administration claimed to be equally committed to the “four pillars” of its China policy: economic partnership, human rights and the rule of law, peace and security, and sustainable development; but it seemed prioritize the economic partnership.[52] Chretien personally led multiple massive “Team Canada” trade missions, consisting of high-level government officials and hundreds of business leaders, to China with the aim of establishing commercial connections with Chinese businesses.[53] In order to further develop trade relations with China, Chretien quickly mended fences with China and restored diplomatic relations, which were damaged by the Tiananmen Massacre. In 1995, he even invited Chinese Premier Li Peng, one of the key figures behind the Massacre, to Canada for an official visit.[54] The Chinese regime was very welcoming of Chretien’s approach towards itself. Reminiscent of the situation in 1970, the regime took advantage of the Canadian Prime Minister’s eagerness to develop relations to re-establish legitimacy in international politics after the 1989 Tiananmen fiasco.[55]

Despite Chretien’s efforts, Canada’s economic performance in China continued to underwhelm as Canada’s share of the Chinese market was decreasing relative to other countries: Its share of China’s import market dropped from 1.41% in 1997 to 0.97% at the end of the Liberal Party’s reign in 2005.[56] Despite the increase in bilateral trade, Canada had developed a growing trade deficit with China.[57]

In terms of human rights, the Chretien administration was quick to shift gears from assertive diplomacy back to quiet diplomacy. It dropped Canada’s sponsorship of the annual resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights that condemned China’s human rights violations; instead, it opted for more private bilateral human rights dialogue in the form of the Canada-China Joint Committee on Human Rights, which held nine meetings between 1997 and 2005.[58] Unfortunately, according to a report commissioned by the Canadian federal government, these meetings were largely ineffective in bringing about progress on important human rights issues in China, with participants from both sides unsatisfied with the process.[59] The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the department responsible for Canada’s involvement in the meeting, was accused of “going through the motions.”[60] To make matters worse, their Chinese counterpart, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), was ill-suited for the job — the MFA’s main task was to promote and protect China’s interests abroad, not to decide China’s domestic policies.[61] In fact, no senior Chinese official who possessed the authority to alter China’s human rights policies had ever been involved in these meetings.[62] According to Burton, the MFA saw the meetings as “a concession to Canada” in exchange for Canada abandoning the aforementioned annual UN resolution and as a measure to satisfy “Canadian domestic political demands,” not as a venue for actually solving domestic human rights issues.[63] Instead, the MFA aimed to “defuse foreign unease regarding China’s human rights record” through these meetings[64], treating them as public relations exercises.

The high-level meetings between government officials were no better. The perfunctory private discussions on human rights between Canadian and Chinese leaders as described in Chretien’s memoir perfectly encapsulate the superficial commitment of both sides to improving human rights in China:

“…the dance was always the same. I would raise it, as he [President Jiang Zemin] knew I had to. He would tell me, in the nicest possible way, to mind my own business. We would adjourn to meet the press. I would say we had discussed the issue; he would say, no comment.”[65]

Chretien justified his weak human rights policies with Canada’s limited power and influence as a smaller nation, claiming that he couldn’t tell “the president of a country with 1.2 billion people” what to do.[66] Furthermore, he argued that, due to Canada’s lack of economic leverage over China, direct confrontation over human rights with China, especially linking trade with human rights, would not induce China to change since “[China] would not feel threatened by Canada [economically] strangling them.”[67] Chretien thought that such confrontation would only harm Canada’s economic interests in China. The Chretien administration also believed that China’s economic liberalization would eventually induce political democratization[68] — a surprisingly optimistic belief after the brutal Tiananmen Massacre that saw the Chinese government use brutal state violence to suppress democratic protests in Beijing.

Stephen Harper

After Stephen Harper came to power in 2006, Canada-China relations on the government level steadily deteriorated. Seeking to establish its own distinct brand of foreign policy, the Harper administration banned Canadian officials from using the terms “engagement” and “strategic partnership,” terms used by the previous Liberal administrations, when describing Canada-China relations.[69] It also suspended the Liberals’ Team Canada trade missions.[70] On the human rights front, he quickly reverted Canada’s human rights diplomacy regarding China back to assertive diplomacy. However, unlike his Conservative predecessor Brian Mulroney, who turned to assertive diplomacy as a reaction to the Tiananmen Massacre, Harper actively took a harder line on China’s human rights from the beginning of his term. His administration postponed the aforementioned annual bilateral human rights dialogue with China, the poster child of the previous Liberal government’s quite diplomacy, while tasking a Human Rights Subcommittee to assess these meetings. The Subcommittee’s report concluded that they were a hoax by the Chinese government to assuage Canadian human rights concerns, and the meetings have not been held since.[71] Unfortunately, Harper’s assertive policies did not result in improved human rights practices by the Chinese government.[72]

Furthermore, Harper was also shaking the foundation of Canada-China relations that had been established since 1970 by openly showing support for Tibet and Taiwan. Unlike his predecessor Paul Martin who had met with the Dalai Lama privately and had treated him as a religious leader,[73] Harper received the persecuted Tibetan leader, who was granted honorary Canadian citizenship the year before, in his Parliament office in 2007 in an official capacity akin to a state visit, complete with a Tibetan flag displayed on Harper’s desk.[74] In another provocative move, the Harper administration sent four cabinet ministers to attend Taiwan’s “Double Ten” national founding day celebration in 2006.[75] According to Canada’s former Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan, any perceived interference of China’s sovereignty over Tibet or Taiwan was “guaranteed to make the [Chinese] government see red.”[76] Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government was extremely unhappy with Harper’s provocative gestures, referring to his meeting with the Dalai Lama as “disgusting conduct” and “blatant interference” in Chinese domestic affairs.[77] As a result, Canada’s relations with China sunk to its nadir under the Harper administration.

On the other hand, despite its aggressive and almost belligerent diplomacy towards China, the Harper administration still wanted to maintain a robust economic relationship with China. This approach to China was described by Harper’s Parliamentary Secretary Jason Kenney as “principled engagement.”[78] In contrast to Harper’s quote on how Canadians did not want their government to “sell out important Canadian values” and “sell out to the almighty dollar” when asked about confronting China on human rights,[79] his administration undertook policies that encouraged trade with China, such as transforming the Liberals’ Pacific Gateway Strategy into the Asia Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative and setting up six new trade offices in China.[80] Like his Liberal predecessors, Harper wanted to diversify Canada’s exports, especially Alberta’s burgeoning energy industry. Harper envisioned Canada as an “energy superpower,” and the Asia-Pacific market, especially the Chinese market, had a huge and steadily growing demand for energy.[81] By tapping into the Asia-Pacific market, he could secure not only the growth of the Canadian energy industry but also the Conservatives’ biggest voter base.[82] Unfortunately, his attempt to compartmentalize politics and trade in Canada-China relations was unsuccessful, as Canadian businesses were reportedly losing contracts with their Chinese counterparts due to poor relations between their governments.[83]

After the 2008 financial crisis that saw the U.S. and the E.U.’s economy plummet and China’s remain largely unscathed, the diversification of the Canadian economy and Canada-China trade relations became even more important for Canada. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 2008–2009 was also the turning point of Harper’s China policies, marked by Harper’s first visit to China in December 2009.[84] In the face of China’s growing economic importance on the global stage, the Conservatives’ pragmatism overcame their ideological dogmatism. By 2009, Harper’s human rights policies towards China had largely returned from assertive to quite diplomacy;[85] Canada no longer openly challenged China on sensitive issues such as human rights violations and territorial sovereignty controversies, publicly acknowledging China’s “distinct points of view” on human rights.[86] By 2010, Harper had started using the previously banned term “strategic partnership” again in public speeches.[87] Finally, in 2011, the Chinese government declared that Canada-China relations had become healthy again. Chinese sources reveal that Canada’s shift to more friendly relations with China was an important precondition for the renewal of Chinese investment in Canadian energy.[88] Nevertheless, the Harper administration did not completely acquiesce and continued to publicly voice its concerns on individual cases of human rights issues in China, as demonstrated in its protesting the persecution of Chinese human rights activists such as law professor Xu Zhiyong, Uyghur activist Ilham Tohti, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo.[89]

Indeed, while Harper had been willing to make substantial adjustments to his China policies, his political views on China does not seem to have changed. Harper once described himself as someone whose “fundamental beliefs” had not changed for a long time but who was able to evolve his views on “individual issues” and “deal with the situation as [he] finds it.”[90] Both his visit as a private citizen to Taiwan in October 2019, which drew the ire of the Chinese government, and his thinly veiled criticism of China’s economic model during this visit[91] suggest that his anti-China leanings as a Canadian conservative are intact despite his reconciliatory policies towards China in his later years as Prime Minister.

Conclusions

On the one hand, it is necessary to consider the personal views of Canada’s prime ministers when observing the evolution of Canada’s relations with China from 1970 to 2015. Pierre Trudeau’s personal experiences in China and his internationalist outlook made him relatively sympathetic to Communist China compared to other Western politicians, leading him to reach out diplomatically to the isolated giant. Jean Chretien’s enthusiasm for developing trade with an emerging Chinese market explains his administration’s tacit tolerance of China’s lack of progress on human rights. Stephen Harper’s conservative politics made him predisposed to pursue tough policies against Communist China, only relenting when practical concerns regarding economic relations outweighed his ideological considerations.

On the other hand, despite the varying policies of these different prime ministers, the results of Canada’s diplomacy regarding China were largely unsatisfactory after the 1970 breakthrough of establishing diplomatic ties. Canada did not fully achieve either of its long-term goals in its relations with China, namely expansion of bilateral trade and inducement of political openness in China. Various Canadian administrations tried to balance these two goals and fulfill them simultaneously, yet often found the two to be mutually conflicting. In many cases, the Canadian government had to compromise on human rights issues in order to pursue the Chinese market. Nevertheless, as discussed in the paper, Canada’s trade performance with China remained underwhelming despite the efforts of various Canadian administrations, and China remained an authoritarian regime with a spotty human rights record in 2015 despite decades of human rights diplomacy from Canada. While the ineffective policies of various Canadian Prime Ministers deserve some blame, the ultimate reason for such diplomatic disappointment lay in Canada’s limited political and economic influence as a “middle power” as well as its lack of leverage over China. As China gradually grew stronger both politically and economically after 1970, Canada-China relations became more and more unbalanced. Economically, while the Chinese market was recognized by the Canadian government as important to the development and diversification of the Canadian economy, China had no such dependence on Canada as many other countries around the world were eager to expand trade with China. Politically, the Chinese Communist regime, authoritarian by nature, was never genuinely interested in substantial political reform and democratization. It instead often used its human rights dialogue with Canada as a means to gain political legitimacy in international politics, owing to Canada’s excellent international reputation. As a result of the above factors, it is no surprise that Canada’s relations with China has been unfulfilling for Canada.

Footnotes

(Author’s note: Chicago style is such a pain in the rear)

[1] Paul M. Evans, Engaging China: Myth, Aspiration, and Strategy in Canadian Policy from Trudeau to Harper, UTP Insights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), Preface xiv-xv.

[2] Charles Burton, “The Dynamic of Relations between Canada and China,” In Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. D. Bratt, and C. Kukucha (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 171.

[3] Ivan L. Head and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968–1984 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995), 222.

[4] Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, 225.

[5] United Nations, “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758,” October 25, 1971.

[6] John Fraser, “15 June 1989 Interview,” Robert Bothwell and J. L. Granatstein, Trudeau’s World: Insiders Reflect on Foreign Policy, Trade, and Defence, 1968–84 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 304.

[7] B. Michael Frolic, “Canada and China: The China Strategy of 1987,” Vivienne Poy and Huhua Cao, eds., The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011): 48.

[8] Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, 221.

[9] Charles Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context of Canada’s China Policy since 1970,” Vivienne Poy and Huhua Cao, eds., The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011): 35.

[10] Burton, “Canadian Policy Context,” 36.

[11] Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Jacques Hébert, Two Innocents in Red China, New ed. (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007).

[12] J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, (University of Toronto Press, 1990), 203.

[13] Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 179.

[14] Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, 227.

[15] Mitchell Sharp, Which Reminds Me — : A Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 204–05.

[16] Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 202.

[17] Jeremy Paltiel, “Canada in China’s Grand Strategy,” Pitman B. Potter and Thomas Adams, eds., “Issues in Canada-China Relations” (Canadian International Council, 2010), 117–118.

[18] Sharp, Which Reminds Me — , 206.

[19] Evans, Engaging China, 30.

[20] Fred Edwards, “Chinese Shadows,” Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin, eds., Canada among nations, 2008: 100 years of Canadian foreign policy. (McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP: 2009), 303.

[21] Chen Wenzhao, “On the Uniqueness and Far-reaching Significance of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Canada,” in Past and Future in China-Canada Relations (the Institute of Asian Research & the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Shanghai, 10–12 Nov 2010).

[22] Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 202.

[23] Canada, ed., Foreign Policy for Canadians (Ottawa: Dept. of External Affairs, 1970).

[24] Ivan Head, “31 August 1987 Interview,” Robert Bothwell and J. L. Granatstein, Trudeau’s World: Insiders Reflect on Foreign Policy, Trade, and Defence, 1968–84 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 60.

[25] Burton, “Canadian Policy Context,” 37.

[26] Evans, Engaging China, 31.

[27] Charles-Louis Labrecque, “The Evolution of Canada’s Policy Towards Human Rights in China Since 1970,” Huhua Cao and Jeremy Paltiel, eds., Facing China as a New Global Superpower: Domestic and International Dynamics from a Multidisciplinary Angle, (Singapore: Springer, 2016), 129.

[28] Labrecque, “The Evolution of Canada’s Policy,” 129–30.

[29] Evans, Engaging China, 32–33.

[30] Cabinet of Canada, “Canadian Strategy for China,” Memorandum to the Cabinet of Canada (PNRE-0194. File 20–1–2 China, Volume 38: 1987).

[31] Michael Frolic, “The China Strategy of 1987,” 53–54.

[32] Cabinet of Canada, “Canadian Strategy for China.”

[33] Labrecque, “The Evolution of Canada’s Policy,” 127–28.

[34] The Globe and Mail, “Greater sense of well-being evident in China, PM says.” (Toronto, Ontario, A.5: May 13, 1986).

[35] Paul Gecelovsky and T. A. Keenleyside, “Canada’s International Human Rights Policy in Practice: Tiananmen Square,” International Journal 50, no. 3 (1995): 565.

[36] Evans, Engaging China, 34.

[37] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, “Tiananmen Square,” 568.

[38] Joe Clark, House of Commons, Hansard, 5 June 1989.

[39] Labrecque, “The Evolution of Canada’s Policy,” 128.

[40] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, “Tiananmen Square,” 569–79.

[41] Ibid., 577.

[42] Ibid., 578.

[43] Ibid., 579.

[44] “Chinese community outraged by $100 million loan to Beijing,” Toronto Star, 3 August 1989.

[45] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, “Tiananmen Square,” 588.

[46] Brian Mulroney, Memoirs: 1939–1993 (Toronto: M&S, 2007), 996.

[47] Gecelovsky and Keenleyside, “Tiananmen Square,” 588.

[48] Brian Mulroney, Memoirs: 1939–1993, 996.

[49] Ibid., 996.

[50] Lois Harder and Steve Patten, eds., The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in Canada (Montreal: Published for the Centre for Constitutional Studies by McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 125.

[51] Lois Harder and Steve Patten, eds., The Chrétien Legacy, 134.

[52] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Canada-China Relations Celebrating 25 Years: Visit to Canada by Li Peng Premier of the People’s Republic of China” (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1995), 24.

[53] Burton, “Canadian Policy Context,” 40.

[54] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Canada-China Relations Celebrating 25 Years,” 1 and 9.

[55] Evans, Engaging China, 50.

[56] Fred Edwards, “Chinese Shadows,” 306.

[57] Wenran Jiang, “Meeting the China Challenge: Developing a China Strategy,” Andrew Fenton Cooper and D. Rowlands, eds., Canada among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 252–53.

[58] Evans, Engaging China, 45.

[59] Charles Burton, “Assessment of the Canada-China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue,” (April 19, 2006), 16–18.

[60] Charles Burton, “Assessment of the Canada-China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue,” 18.

[61] Ibid., 8.

[62] Ibid., 16.

[63] Ibid., 15.

[64] Ibid., 16.

[65] Jean Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister (Toronto: A.A. Knopf Canada, 2007), 342.

[66] Jean Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister, 340–41.

[67] “Canada Can’t Sway China on Rights, PM Says,” The Globe and Mail, 19 March 1994.

[68] House of Commons, Hansard, 4 June 1996, 3383–3384; Jean Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister, 343.

[69] Evans, Engaging China, 62.

[70] Wenran Jiang, Dragon Returns: Canada in China’s Quest for Energy Security (S.l.: Canadian International Council, 2010), 16.

[71] Charles Burton, “Canada’s China Policy under the Harper Government,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 49.

[72] Labrecque, “The Evolution of Canada’s Policy,” 140.

[73] Paul Martin, Hell or High Water: My Life in and out of Politics (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2008), 363.

[74] Charles Burton, “Canada’s China Policy under the Harper Government,” 49; Kim Richard Nossal and Leah Sarson, “About Face: Explaining Changes in Canada’s China Policy, 2006–2012,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (May 4, 2014): 148.

[75] Evans, Engaging China, 64.

[76] Mark MacGuigan and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, An Inside Look at External Affairs during the Trudeau Years: The Memoirs of Mark MacGuigan (Calgary, Alta: University of Calgary Press, 2002), 148.

[77] Alan Freeman, “Beijing Blasts ‘conniving’ Canada,” The Globe and Mail, (30 October 2007).

[78] Jason Kenney, Interview with Jason Kenney, Question Period-CTV, (6 December 2009).

[79] Brian Laghi, “Harper Promises He Won’t ‘Sell Out’ on Rights: Moral Stand Trumps Trade with China, Says after Snub.” The Globe and Mail, (16 November 2006).

[80] Evans, Engaging China, 62.

[81] Kim Richard Nossal and Leah Sarson, “About Face,” 151.

[82] Ibid., 154–55.

[83] Peter Harder, “Dealing with China,” The Globe and Mail, (24 May 2008).

[84] Labrecque, “The Evolution of Canada’s Policy,” 139.

[85] Ibid., 141.

[86] Government of Canada, “Canada-China joint statement,” (3 December 2009), retrieved from http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2009/12/03/canada-china-joint-statement.

[87] Speech made by Stephen Harper at the Canada-China Business Council gala dinner, June 24, 2010, in Wenran Jiang, Dragon Returns, 17, note 36.

[88] Wenran Jiang, Dragon Returns, 17.

[89] Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Statement on sentencing of law professor Xu Zhiyong,” 26 January 2014.

[90] Brian Laghi, “Harper Says He’s ‘Evolved,’” The Globe and Mail, (12 January 2006).

[91] Nathan Vanderklippe, “China Issues Angry Criticism of Stephen Harper’s Visit to Taiwan,” The Globe and Mail, (14 October 2019).

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